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Giving recently bankrupt cardholders new
credit lines may not be a bad strategy, considering the way they use the cards and the fact
that they can't refile for bankruptcy for six
years.

Bankruptcy in a Bank
Credit Card Portfolio
A. CHARLENE SULLIVAN
DEBRA DRECNIK WORDEN

While credit losses are a cost of doing business for credit card issuers, the recent trend in
nonbusiness bankruptcy raises concerns about
the predictability of future bad debts. The dollar
value of charged-off accounts is rising faster
than outstandings, and losses due to bankruptcy
are rising even more rapidly. From 1980 to 1990,
average net chargeoffs increased from 2.92% to
3.51 % of outstandings on Visa credit cards.
Bankruptcy losses climbed to 43% of net chargeoffs in 1990, up from 27% in 1980. While interest
spreads for bank cards have been sufficient to
absorb increased credit losses for the largest
card issuers, the threat of the bankruptcy "wild
card" makes the expected economic benefits of

A. Charlene Sullivan teaches at the Krannert Graduate
School of Management, Purdue University, and Debra Drecnik Worden is with Olivet Nazarene University.

bank credit cards very uncertain for smaller issuers, issuers offering low interest rates, and
those with high operating costs or a high cost of
funds.
This research examines the card use of credit
cardholders who filed bankruptcy in the first
five months of 1991. (This period was selected
because of data availability. There is no reason
to believe that the results will be biased by this
limitation on the analysis.) Measures of their activity and profitability in the calendar year prior
to chargeoff are analyzed and compared to
equivalent measures for accounts charged off
due to severe delinquency, as well as to those for
a random sample of credit card accounts. The
question addressed is: How do bankruptcies differ from delinquency chargeoffs? After describing various dimensions of the card use behavior
of the two groups, the paper contains a multi-
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variate analysis of factors associated with borrowers' choices between bankruptcy and outright default, including legal conditions that
define lenders' rights to debtors' income and assets inside and outside bankruptcy court. The
paper addresses the extent of the "abusive or
unnecessary bankruptcy" in the portfolio. Further, an estimate of the expected profitability of
providing new credit cards to bankrupts is presented.
Lenders are greatly concerned about the growing percentage of losses attributed to bankruptcy. The trend is interpreted as an indication of
an increasing nondiversifiable risk for credit
card issuers and a decline in borrowers' sense of
responsibility for debt repayment. Alternate interpretations are that growing bankruptcy
losses reflect the increased availability of unsecured credit to high-risk borrowers or an increase in the probability that debtors in distress
have multiple credit accounts and view bankruptcy as a more efficient means of solving credit problems than renegotiation with creditors or
outright default.

A Six-Year Hiatus
From the borrower's point of view, to petition
for bankruptcy or to simply default are alternative means of debt relief. The borrower's choice
is expected to be that avenue which provides the
greatest expected value of debts discharged, net
of costs. Either action may have a negative impact on the availability of future credit. But the
borrower who files under Chapter 7 may not file
again for six years, a factor that may enhance
the market's perception of his or her future creditworthiness and so reduce the relative cost of
bankruptcy. While this analysis considers only
one of many credit contracts the distressed borrowers may have had, it provides insights into
the factors that influence debtors' choices of
bankruptcy over outright default.
The data analyzed reflect the activity in a
large geographically diversified portfolio of
standard bank credit cards in 1990 and the first
five months of 1991. Cardholders in the portfolio resided in each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. As an indication of the credit
risk of the portfolio, about 2. 7% of accounts
opened before Jan. 1, 1990, were charged off in

1990 with net dollars lost equal to 4.69% of average outstandings. 1 Twenty-eight percent of
charged-off accounts were due to bankruptcy,
45% were due to severe delinquency, 1.5% resulted from the death of the cardholder, and 24%
were attributed to fraud. 2 While bankrupts
made up 28% of charged-off accounts, they were
responsible for 34% of the estimated net dollars
charged off, with only 2% of bankrupts making a
payment after chargeoff, compared with 19% of
the delinquency group.
The sample of accounts analyzed includes all
standard accounts charged off in the first five
months of 1991 after bankruptcy or severe delinquency. These accounts were analyzed relative to a random sample of active accounts that
were open before 1990 and remained open
throughout that year. For most of the analysis,
this sample was further reduced to those accounts open before 1990 - thus providing a full
12 months of activity for all accounts analyzed.
The greatest risk of loss occurs early in the life
of the account (Table 1). Charged-off accounts
had an average life of about 27 months, while
that for open accounts was 55 months. 3 Less
than 5% of charged-off accounts had been open
for more than 60 months, compared with about
one-third of open accounts. The cardholders represented by the charged-off accounts were more
likely to be very young (25 or younger) than the
open accounts. But, on average, cardholders
with open accounts were only slightly older than
cardholders with charged-off accounts (41 versus 38). The distributions of life of the accounts
and age of cardholders were significantly different for bankrupt and delinquency chargeoff
groups.
Almost 40% of open accounts had credit lines
above $3,000, in contrast to about 20% of bankrupt accounts and 14% of the delinquency
chargeoffs. But the greatest distinction between
the open and charged-off accounts was in the
percentages with credit lines in excess of $4,500
(13% of open accounts versus 2% to 2.5% of the
charged-off groups). Some of the size disparity
could be attributed to lenders' assessment of the
credit risk of the charged-off accounts. But since
the credit line typically grows over the life of an
account, the differences in credit-line sizes may
also be attributable to the difference in account
lives for the two groups.
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Table 1: Analysis of Charged-Off Accounts

Characteristics

Accounts Open
Throughout 1990

Mean Account,
Life (months)

55

26

27

4.0%
23.5
41.8
30.7

5.0%
48.1
43.1
3.8

4.6%
53.6
37.3
4.5

< 12 months
13-24
25-60
>60 months

Accounts Charged Off in 1991
Bankruptcy
Delinquency

x2=12.8*
Mean Cardholder
Age (years)

<=22
23-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
>65

41
0.8%
7.8
34.6
25.2
14.2
8.7
8.7

38

38

1.90/o
9.0
37.4
29.1
13.0
6.3
3.3

1.1%
11.9
39.3
24.7
13.6
5.1
4.3
X2= 17.3*

Mean Credit Line

<=$1000
$1001-1500
$1501-2000
$2001-2500
$2501-3000
$3001-4500
>4500

$2886
5.7%
18.1
9.6
14.9
13.1
25.7
12.9

$2270
7.3%
30.2
12.0
23.6
12.5
12.3
2.1

$2398

6.5%
24.3
11.5
25.8
12.4
17.0
2.5
X2=23.4*

Number of accounts
(opened prior to 1990)

8484

1146

2025

*Distributions of bankrupts and delinquents are signlficantl~lfferent at the 95% level of confidence.
Whereas most of the a~is was for accounts opened fore 1990, the life distribution Includes
accounts open during 1
as well.
1

The size of credit lines held by the bankruptcy
charge-off group was distributed differently
from that of the delinquency group. The bankrupt accounts were more likely to have credit
lines above $3,000. The average life of the accounts was also distributed differently for the
two charge-off groups, with the bankrupts being
somewhat more likely to have had their accounts
more than 24 months. Cardholders in the bankrupt group had probably been judged, on average, to be of better credit quality than those in
the delinquency group by the card issuer. This
difference is not totally unexpected, as the ma-

jority of bankruptcies are associated with unexpected changes in financial circumstances, conditions that could befall cardholders from a wide
range of economic circumstances.
The charged-off accounts differed significantly from the open accounts along all usage dimensions (Table 2). They were more likely to revolve, and revolved most of the year. Chargedoff account holders used an average of about
78% of their available line versus about 39% for
the open accounts. The charged-off groups were
about five times more likely to have been over
limit in 1990 than the open accounts and were
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Table 2: Analysis of Charged-Off Accounts by Usage

1990 Activity Measures

Accounts Open
Throughout 1990

Revolve
Proportion of 1990 Revolved
% Credit Line Used
Average Daily Balance
High Balance/Credit Line
Used Cash Advance
Average Amount of Advances
Overlimit
Proportion of 1990 Overlimit
Delinquent
Proportion of 1990 Delinquent
1990 Delinquency History
Never delinquent
> 0 <= 3 months
> 3 months <= 9 months
> 9 months

Accounts Charged Off in 1991
Bankruptcy
Delinquency

75.1%
.80
38.7%
$945
52.3%
22.6%
$759
11.7%
.20
43.3%
.25

100%
.98
87.3%
$2074
99.5%
45.6%
$725
57.4%
.35
95.9%
.54

56.7%
30.0
12.3
1.0

4.1%
21.6
53.4
20.9

100%

.as·

68.4%*
$1543*
79.5%*
26.2%*
$676
50.1%*
.46*
100%*
.67*
0%
2.9
65.0
32.1

*Statistics for bankrupts and delinquents are significantly different at 95% level of confidence.

considerably more likely to use cash advances
than the open accounts. However, the mean dollar amount of their total cash advances was not
significantly different from that for the open accounts ($694 vs. $759).
The bankrupts used their accounts more aggressively than the delinquents on every activity dimension with the most pronounced difference being in cash advance usage. The bankrupts
were almost twice as likely to use cash advances,
though the average dollar value of cash advances did not differ across the two groups
($725 vs. $676). Their active use of cash advances might have provided an early warning of
bankruptcy. If a cardholder is using a credit card
as a temporary substitute for lost wages or
drawing on one card to keep other credit obligations current, there could be substantial cash advance activity. Or a cardholder could use cash
advances to draw down the credit line in anticipation of bankruptcy, although discharge of
such debt obligations could be disallowed by the
Bankruptcy Code.
The chargeoff accounts were more likely to
have been delinquent than the open accounts, regardless of the reason for charge off. Almost

96% of bankrupts had been delinquent in 1990.
On average, they had been delinquent for slightly more than half the year. It is safe to conclude
that many of the bankrupts would have ultimately been charged off because of chronic delinquency. But since they are able to continue
collection efforts after a delinquency chargeoff
but not after bankruptcy, lenders suffer more
from chargeoff due to bankruptcy than from
chargeoff due to chronic delinquency. Because
late payments actually precipitated their official
chargeoff, all the delinquency chargeoffs had
been delinquent in 1990 and for an average of almost two-thirds of the year.
A substantial percentage of bankrupts did not
have serious repayment problems (on this particular card) in the calendar year before filing.
About 4% of bankrupts had not been delinquent
at all in 1990, and another 22% had been delinquent for three months or less. But about 21 %
had been delinquent more than nine months.
The Abusive Bankrupt. Lenders report that
they receive bankruptcy notices from borrowers
who have never been delinquent. This suggests
that borrowers may be legally voiding debts
through bankruptcy when debt relief is not nee-
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essary. A 1982 analysis estimated that about
20% of bankrupts who filed under Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code had the ability to repay all
their debts out of disposable income in less than
three years. 4 By filing under Chapter 7, all their
disposable income was protected from unsecured lenders' claims. Unpredictable or unnecessary bankruptcy is particularly threatening for
unsecured lenders, whose claims are generally
discharged completely in Chapter 7.
Do accounts that were in bankruptcy after a
short delinquency represent abusive or unnecessary bankruptcies? 5 An analysis of the 25% of
bankrupt accounts that had been the least delinquent revealed that, relative to the average
bankrupt, these had larger credit lines (an average of $2,521, with 25% having credit lines
above $3,000 and 4% with lines greater than
$4,500), were slightly older accounts (average
life of 29 months), and represented cardholders
with higher average age ( 42 years). The least delinquent were dramatically more likely to use
cash advances (about 62% ) than the average
bankrupts. Further, they used an average of six
cash advances in 1990 versus between two and
three for the other bankrupts. In fact, there was
little difference in the cash-advance usage of delinquency and bankruptcy chargeoffs when the
least delinquent bankrupts were excluded from
the analysis.
Since these data reflect only activity on one
card, it is not possible to conclude that these

bankruptcies were unnecessary. However, their
cash-advance activity certainly distinguished
this group from the rest of the bankrupts and
suggests some measure of "loading up" before
bankruptcy. 6
Given their heavy use of the credit card and
the high level of fees associated with exceeding
credit limits and missing payments, the chargeoff accounts generated attractive cash flows
in the year before their charge off. The average
net contribution before taxes per open account
was $76.75, while that for the bankrupt and delinquency chargeoffs was $185.46 and $147.26
respectively (Table 3). The average annual profitability per account for each group of accounts
was calculated based on actual interest paid,
fees, and merchant interchange earned, net of interest expense, estimated at 8.16%, and operating costs, estimated at 6.25% of the average
balance.
The average net contribution before losses on
accounts that were charged off demonstrates
that, with limits on their ability to default again,
these cardholders may be attractive targets for
new credit. Unlike the delinquency chargeoff,
the bankruptcy chargeoff is legally prohibited
from filing bankruptcy again for six years, a factor that may effectively reduce their credit risk
for that period. And this factor does seem to be
taken into account in the credit marketplace. A
recent study demonstrated that 20% of bankrupts had a new unsecured credit line within 12

Table 3: Profit Analysis of Charged-Off Accounts

Profitability in 1990

Accounts Open
Throughout 1990

Accounts Charged Off in 1991 due to:
Delinquency
Bankruptcy

(mean values)
Interest Margin
Fee Income
Interchange
Operating Expense
Net Contribution 1
Estimated Net Chargeoff

$86.83
24.62
13.49

$220.67
63.97
5.07

$167.90
53.39
3.50

48.19
76.75

104.25
185.46

77.53
147.26

0

2342.06

1770.31

tThe figures for net contribution do not include any loss expense as none of the accounts analyzed
here were charged off in 1990. The net contribution for all standard cards, including those charged
off or closed in 1990, was $29.68.
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months of their bankruptcy filing and that 60%
had new credit within five years. 7
The data on the annual profitability of the
bankrupt accounts in this sample are used to assess whether there is value created by this strategy. Assume that the credit demands of people
who file bankruptcy will not change after their
bankruptcy. Assume further that the size of
their credit line stays constant. And assume that
15 % of bankrupts will file again at the end of the
six years, the waiting period required by law. 8
With an average balance of $2,074 and annual
net earnings of $185.46 per account, the expected net present value (discounted at 8% per year)
for six years of activity equals $397. Given the
assumptions stated, it makes economic sense to
give a new unsecured credit line to a previously
bankrupt account holder. However, the results
would be different if, after the first bankruptcy,
the cardholder attempted to minimize overlimit
and delinquency fees, or the probability of repeat bankruptcy increased. Further, this analysis takes the view that providing credit to bankrupts will not affect the probability of
bankruptcy in the overall population of borrowers. If, however, the strategy communicates to
other borrowers that there is no stigma to bankruptcy, it may well prove counterproductive.

Choosing to File
The distressed debtor who has not filed bankruptcy in the previous six years is free to default
outright or file bankruptcy to gain relief from
debts. The borrower's choice is a function of the
expected value of debts discharged, net of costs,
including assets or income forfeited, and any residual effect the action might have on the future
availability of credit. This data set provides a
unique opportunity to empirically evaluate the
factors that influence distressed borrowers'
choices between default and bankruptcy.
Borrowers' choices between bankruptcy and
default are expected to vary with their age (a
proxy for number and variety of credit contracts) and size of debt obligations (as measured
by size of credit line), with the probability that
the distressed debtor chooses bankruptcy increasing with both variables. Young borrowers
with fewer credit contracts and borrowers with
smaller credit lines are expected to have less

need for court protection than older borrowers
with more varied contracts and borrowers with
larger credit obligations.
Borrowers' choices are also expected to reflect
factors related to the life of the account and the
way the account was used. Holding other things
constant, debtors who have maintained successful credit relations for some period of time and
then experience financial difficulty are expected
to be more likely to file bankruptcy than to default outright. And borrowers who use a large
number of cash advances or who consistently
use a high percentage of their credit line are expected to be more likely to file bankruptcy than
to default. These behaviors may be attributed to
"loading up" the line of credit in anticipation of
bankruptcy or to the use of the credit line as a
substitute for lost earnings.
To evaluate the determinants of borrowers'
choices (measured as a 0/1 variable, where 1
equals the bankruptcy choice and 0 is default), a
multivariate logit model was employed. The resulting maximum likelihood equation estimates
the probability that a distressed debtor will
choose bankruptcy over default. Explanatory
variables in the model included measures of the
legal environment of the debtors' states concerning creditors' rights to debtors' assets and income, the age of the cardholder, the life of the
account, the size of credit line, and measures of
how the card was used in the year before chargeoff - the number of cash advances taken and
the average balance as a percentage of the credit
line.
The creditors' ability to garnishee wages is
measured by two 0/1 variables. The variable
"Restricted Garnishment" takes the value of 1
for those states where more wages are protected
from garnishment than is provided by the Federal Consumer Protection Act. 9 The variable "Prohibited Garnishment"' takes the value 1 for
those states where 100% of the debtor's wages
are protected from garnishment for payment of
consumer credit. 1 Creditors' claim to debtors'
assets in bankruptcy is measured by a 0/1 variable that distinguishes states that provide a
homestead exemption less than the Federal
Bankruptcy Code homestead allowance of
$ 7 ,500 per debtor .11
The logit equation performed reasonably well
in predicting the distressed debtor's choice of

°
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Table 4: Logit Analysis of Debtor's Choice of Bankruptcy vs. Delinquency

Independent Variables

A. All Chargeoffs
Estimated
Absolute
Coefficients
t-Statistic

Variable
Mean

B. Exclude "Abusive" Bankruptcy
Absolute
Estimated
Variable
Coefficients
t-Statistic
Mean

Life of Account (months)
Age of Principal Cardholder (yrs.)
Credit Line ($)
% Credit Line Used in '90
# Cash Advances in '90

0.007*
0.001
0.0002*
0.018*
0.062*

1.97
0.29
3.26
12.66
4.84

24.0
37.8
2272
76.0
1.3

0.006
-0.007
0.0002*
0.023*
0.027

1.45
1.79
2.74
12.84
1.83

24.0
37.5
2257
75.7
1.2

State Laws
Restricted Garnishment
Prohibited Garnishment
Low As~t Exemption

-0.521*
-0.665*
0.266*

5.72
5.46
2.82

0.37
0.19
0.27

-0.585*
-0.613*
0.318*

5.77
4.56
3.08

0.37
0.20
0.27

2.367*

10.67

1.0

2.721*

10.51

1.0

Constant
Mean Proportion of Cardholders
Choosing Bankruptcy

0.369
3098

0.302
2800

324.97*
0.076

320.28*
0.091

N**

Model Significance (XZ)
Pseudo adjusted RZ

• Significant at the 95% level of confidence.
••Accounts opened in 1990 were included in this analysis.

bankruptcy over default (Table 4A). He or she
was significantly less likely to file bankruptcy in
states where garnishment was prohibited or restricted. Further, in states where the value of
the asset exemption was lower than the federal
exemption, distressed debtors were more likely
to file bankruptcy than to default outright. In a
separate analysis, an estimated 21% of bankrupts in low asset states filed under Chapter 13,
vs. only 9% in other states. The difference was
statistically significant. We also found that debtors preferred Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 in states
with low asset exemptions. 12
The debtor's choice did not vary significantly
with age, but the probability of choosing bankruptcy increased significantly with the size of
the credit line. And, holding age and credit line
constant, debtors with older accounts preferred
bankruptcy to outright default. The coefficients
for the number of cash advances and the percentage of credit line used throughout the year
before chargeoff were both significant and positive.

To further investigate the phenomenon of
"abusive or unnecessary bankruptcy," a separate logit analysis of the choice between bankruptcy and default was estimated, excluding all
bankrupts that had been delinquent for less than
three months in 1990 (Table 4B). In the analysis
of the choices of cardholders who had all been
severely delinquent in the year before chargeoff,
the coefficient of the cash-advance variable decreased markedly in size and significance, supporting our earlier sentiment that cash-advance
usage was a distinguishing characteristic of the
less severely delinquent bankrupt. The account
life variable became insignificant, suggesting
that the less severely delinquent bankrupts had
been cardholders longer than the other bankrupts in the sample.
The univariate analysis of the activity, profitability, and delinquency measures for credit
card accounts that had been charged off in 1991
after severe delinquency or bankruptcy demonstrated that, for the most part, bankruptcy
chargeoffs were very similar to delinquency
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chargeoffs. Both groups had been very active users of their credit lines and had generated average earnings before taxes that were more than
double the earnings generated by the average account in the portfolio. And most of the bankrupts had been as severely delinquent in 1990 as
the delinquency group. But our analysis suggests
that, given the manner in which they used credit
cards and the fact that filing bankruptcy bars
them from exercising that option again for six
years, as noted, the group of bankrupts may be
an economically attractive target for new unsecured lines of credit after bankruptcy.
The decision to file bankruptcy vs. outright
default by cardholders with repayment problems was a function of the legal conditions in
their state that govern lenders' ability to seize
income and assets. In states where garnishment
of wages was prohibited or restricted, debtors
were more likely to default outright rather than
file bankruptcy. In states where asset exemptions in bankruptcy were more restricted than
the federal exemption, debtors in trouble were
more likely to file bankruptcy under Chapter 13

than default outright. Holding those conditions
constant, the probability of choosing bankruptcy over outright default increased with the life
and size of the credit account. Further, the probability of choosing bankruptcy was higher for
account holders who had maintained a high average balance relative to their credit line or who
had frequently used the cash-advance feature of
their card.
There is evidence that a substantial portion of
the bankruptcy cases may have been abusive.
That 25% of bankrupts who had been the least
delinquent before chargeoff used an inordinately large number of cash advances before filing,
had larger credit lines, and had been cardholders
longer. While our ability to judge their motives
on the basis of activities in only one of their credit relationships may be limited, this group is distinctive from the other bankrupts in the portfolio. Since they account for about 28% of
bankruptcy losses in this portfolio, efforts to
learn more about the validity of their bankruptcy action may lead to substantial reductions in
credit losses.

Notes

1. The statistics for 1990 are reported because a complete year of data was not available for 1991, the year of
chargeoff for the accounts analyzed in the paper.
2. The reason for chargeoff was not ascertained for 2%
of accounts charged off.
3. Account life was measured by the number of months
between the opening and chargeoff dates for charged-off accounts and the number of months between the opening date
and the current date (May 1991) for open accounts.
4. R.W. Johnson and R.L. Peterson: "Consumers' Right
to Bankruptcy: Origins and Effects," Credit Research Center,
Purdue University, p. 57.
5. Some of the accounts that had not been extremely delinquent in 1990 became more delinquent in 1991 before
chargeoff. On average, however, these accounts were significantly less delinquent before bankruptcy (in months) than
the rest of the bankrupt accounts (4.8 months vs. 10.2
months).
6. The Bankruptcy Code provides that unsecured credit
card debts incurred within 90 days of filing may be excluded
from discharge in Chapter 7.

7. Mike Staten: "Better Screening of Borrowers Can
Stem Bankruptcy" American Banker, Jan. 15, 1991, p. 7.
8. In a survey of people who filed bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 in 1981, 15% said they would consider filing again
in the future. Nine percent had already filed at least once. A.
Charlene Sullivan: "Personal Bankruptcy: Causes, Costs, and
Benefits," Credit Research Center, Purdue University, 1982.
9. There were 25 states where garnishment was restricted in 1990. These are AL, AK, CT, DE, HI, IA, ID, IL, KS, LA,
MA, MD, ME, MN, MO, NE, NH, NJ, NM, NY, OR, RI, VT, WV,
WI.

10. The states where garnishment was prohibited in
1990 were FL, NC, ND, PA, SC, SD, TX.
11. The states that enforced homestead allowances that
were lower than the federal allowance were AL, AR, DE, GA,
KY, MD, NE, NH, OH, OK, SC, TN, VA, WY.
12. See A. Charlene Sullivan and Debra D. Worden, "The
Law and Consumer Demand for Debt Relief Under the Bankruptcy Code," unpublished manuscript, Purdue University,
1991.
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